

Payments for loss of office/payments to former Directors (Audited)

The Company announced on 25 September 2025 that Nick Sanderson, Chief Financial & Operating Officer, had decided to leave the Company. He received his normal salary and benefits for the period employed and, because he voluntarily resigned, was not treated as a good leaver for either bonus, RSP or all-employee SIP purposes. As such, all his outstanding RSP awards lapsed and his unvested DSBP awards will vest on their normal vesting dates in accordance with the plan rules. The treatment of his all-employee SIP awards is governed by statutory regulation, with matching shares held for less than three years being forfeited. He received no termination payment. Nick Sanderson left the Company on 30 January 2026.

New Chief Financial Officer

On 19 January 2026, the Company announced that Jayne Cottam would join as the new Chief Financial Officer on 16 March 2026. Her starting salary has been set at £440,000 (11% lower than Nick's to reflect her role as Chief Financial Officer without separate operational responsibilities and his extensive experience in role). Her salary will next be subject to review in April 2027 and, consistent with past practice, the Committee reserves the right to award higher levels of increase than the normal inflationary increases should it consider that appropriate.

The rest of Jayne's terms are consistent with the standard approach with the first annual RSP award expected to be made to her in July 2026. Due to Jayne commencing employment during the financial year, she is entitled to a pro rata bonus based on the number of days served in the period. She received no form of buy-out or other enhancements.

Statement of voting at the AGMs

The following table shows the results of:

- the advisory vote on the Directors' remuneration report at the 2025 AGM; and
- binding vote on the Directors' remuneration policy commencing from the 2023 AGM.

	For	Against	Abstentions
2025 Directors' remuneration report	264,555,784 (93.25%)	19,150,390 (6.75%)	5,903,652
2023 Directors' remuneration policy	189,336,232 (92.56%)	15,228,255 (7.44%)	3,186

This Report will be submitted to shareholders for approval at the 2026 AGM.

Approved by the Board on 20 May 2026 and signed on its behalf by:

Emma Woods
Chair of the Remuneration Committee

20 May 2026

Directors' remuneration policy

This section of the Directors' remuneration report contains details of the Directors' remuneration policy (the Policy) that will govern the Company's future remuneration payments.

The Policy below sets out the remuneration policy we intend to apply, subject to shareholder approval, from 2 July 2026, the date of the next AGM. Until such approval, the current Policy, which was approved by shareholders at the 2023 AGM, will apply. It is the intention that the new Policy will apply for a period of three years from approval. Revisions to the proposed new Policy primarily relate to changes to the bonus deferral when the minimum share ownership guideline level has been met. Other changes add market standard flexibility to NED notice terms or are made to clarify the wording. The Policy part of the remuneration report, if approved, will be displayed on the Company's website, at www.gpe.co.uk/investors, immediately after the 2026 AGM.

The Company's policy is to provide remuneration packages that fairly reward the Executive Directors for the contribution they have made to the business and to ensure that the packages are appropriately competitive to promote the long-term success of the Company. The policy is to align the Directors' interests with those of shareholders and to incentivise the Directors to meet the Company's financial and strategic priorities by making a significant proportion of remuneration performance-related. The Company's strategic objectives are set out in the Strategic Report on pages 01 to 81.

The Remuneration Committee is satisfied that the Policy outlined in the table below is in the best interests of shareholders, does not raise any environmental, social or governance issues and does not promote excessive risk-taking.

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and process	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics
Fixed remuneration	Base salary To provide a market-competitive salary which takes into account individual responsibilities and attracts and retains talent in the labour market in which the Executive Director is employed.	Reviewed by the Remuneration Committee (the Committee) at least annually and assessed having regard to Company performance, individual responsibilities, inflation, as well as salary levels in comparable organisations (particularly within the listed property sector) and taking account of salary policy and annual increases within the rest of the Group.	Base salary increases will be applied in line with the outcome of the review. In the normal course of events, increases in the base salaries will not exceed the average increase for employees. Increases may be made above this level to take account of market alignment to around mid-market levels of comparable organisations (particularly within the listed property sector) and individual circumstances such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> increase in scope and responsibility; and/or to reflect the individual's development and performance in the role (e.g. for a new appointment where base salary may be increased over time rather than set directly at the level of the previous incumbent or market level). The Committee is, however, mindful of the need to treat comparisons with caution to avoid an upward ratchet of remuneration levels. The salary maximum will be £650,000 (as increased by RPI from July 2017, currently c. £979,900).
	Benefits To provide cost-effective benefits that are valued by the recipient and are appropriately competitive.	Benefits principally comprise life insurance, health insurance, private healthcare subscriptions, travel expenses and membership subscriptions. A company car or company car allowance may be provided, although it is not the Company's current practice to provide either to current Executive Directors. Other benefits may be introduced from time to time to ensure the benefits package is appropriately competitive and reflects individual circumstances. Benefits are reviewed annually and their value is not pensionable.	Set at a level which the Committee considers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> is appropriately positioned against comparable roles in companies of a similar size and complexity (particularly within the listed property sector); and provides a sufficient level of benefits based on the role or an individual's circumstances such as relocation. Benefit values vary year on year depending on premiums and, therefore, the maximum value is the cost of the provision of these benefits. However, the aggregate value of contractual and non-contractual benefits received by each Executive Director (based on the value included in the individual's annual P11D tax calculation) shall not exceed £100,000 p.a. (with this maximum increasing annually at the rate of RPI from 1 April 2014).

Directors' remuneration policy continued

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and process	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics	
Fixed remuneration continued	<p>Pension</p> <p>To provide a framework to save for retirement that is appropriately competitive.</p>	<p>All Executive Directors receive a contribution to their personal pension plan and/or receive a cash equivalent. This cash equivalent is not treated as salary for the purposes of determining bonus or incentive awards.</p>	<p>The current Executive Directors receive a contribution or cash equivalent equal to 15% of base salary which is aligned with the average rate for almost all employees. Any new Executive Directors that are recruited will receive a contribution at no more than the same level as the average all-employee rate (as at the date of recruitment). The contribution rate for Executive Directors may change in line with increases for employees generally.</p>	<p>Not applicable.</p>
Variable remuneration	<p>Annual Bonus Plan</p> <p>Links reward to the annual performance targets, which are set on or about the beginning of the financial year in line with the Company's strategy. Ensures an alignment between the operation of the Directors' remuneration policy and financial measures whilst also ensuring additional operational measures are targeted to drive and encourage a holistic approach to performance.</p>	<p>The Annual Bonus Plan is reviewed annually at the start of the financial year to ensure bonus opportunity, performance measures and weightings are appropriate and continue to support the Company's strategy.</p> <p>Bonuses are paid in cash and shares. Up to 60% of any bonus will be paid in cash following the end of the financial year, or up to 80% where a Director has met the minimum shareholding guideline as below.</p> <p>At least 40% of any bonus outcome will be deferred into shares, typically through the Deferred Share Bonus Plan (the DSBP) and normally for three years. Under this revised Policy, once the minimum shareholding policy level is met the level of deferral may be reduced to 20% with the balance paid in cash.</p> <p>Subject to clawback and malus provisions in situations of personal misconduct and/or where accounts or information relevant to performance are shown to be materially wrong and the bonus paid was higher than should have been the case; and malus only where there are sufficiently exceptional circumstances which impact the reputation of the Company, where there was a material error in determining the grant, size or nature of an award or in the event of corporate insolvency, administration or failure.</p> <p>The target bonus is 50% of maximum (i.e. 75% of base salary). Threshold bonus is not more than 30% of base salary with 0% payable if the threshold is not met.</p>	<p>The maximum bonus is 150% of base salary.</p>	<p>At least 50% of the bonus will be linked to financial measures. The balance will be linked to personal or strategic objectives (including ESG factors). In addition, at least 80% of the total bonus opportunity will be objectively measurable.</p> <p>The performance metrics are set by the Committee each year. The performance period for the Annual Bonus Plan targets is linked to the Company's financial year.</p> <p>The Committee may reduce formulaic bonus outcomes if it considers them to be inconsistent with the performance of the Company, business or individual during the year.</p> <p>The Committee retains the ability to adjust the targets and/or set different measures if events occur which cause it to determine that the conditions are no longer appropriate and the amendment is required so that the conditions achieve their original purpose and are not, in the view of the Committee, materially less difficult to satisfy.</p> <p>Further details on the measures for the financial year 2026/27 are set out on page 124 of the Directors' remuneration report.</p>

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and process	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics	
Grants under the Restricted Share Plan (RSP)	<p>Rewards and retains Executives, aligning them with shareholder interests over a longer timeframe. Ensures an alignment between the operation of the Company's remuneration policy and the Company's KPI of achieving sustained share price growth through ensuring that a significant proportion of executive reward is delivered in shares, thereby aligning their reward with shareholder returns.</p>	<p>Participants are eligible to receive a conditional annual allocation of shares or nil price options (restricted shares).</p> <p>General terms</p> <p>Awards may be adjusted to reflect the impact of any variation of share capital.</p> <p>An award may, at the discretion of the Committee, include the right to receive cash or shares on vesting equal in value to the dividends payable on such number of shares subject to the award which vest, for the period between grant and vesting.</p> <p>A two-year holding period will apply to awards following the end of a three-year underpin period. Awards will typically be structured as nil cost options exercisable from the end of the holding period although the plan may permit earlier exercise following the third anniversary of grant if the resulting (net of tax) shares are similarly locked up for the holding period.</p> <p>Subject to clawback and malus provisions, for all employees in situations of personal misconduct and/or where accounts or information relevant to performance are shown to be materially wrong and vesting was higher than should have been the case; and malus only where there are sufficiently exceptional circumstances which impact the reputation of the Company, where there was a material error in determining the grant, size or nature of an award or in the event of corporate insolvency, administration or failure.</p> <p>Awards under the RSP may be adjusted to reflect the impact of any variation of share capital.</p> <p>Quantum</p> <p>The Committee reviews the quantum of awards annually.</p>	<p>Up to 150% of salary.</p>	<p>The nature of RSPs is to deliver a lesser level of award than an LTIP in return for the greater likelihood of vesting. There is, therefore, a clear default to vesting. Nonetheless, the Committee is keen to avoid payments for failure and will consider the application of an underpin at the third anniversary of grant whereby it may reduce vesting levels (including to zero) where it considers that to be appropriate in all the circumstances (the underpin). Without limitation, it may reduce vesting levels where any of the following occur:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> breach of the financial covenants of the Group's principal debt facilities; failing to make satisfactory progress in delivering our Sustainability Statement of Intent; and there being material damage to the reputation of the Company. <p>The Committee retains the ability to adjust the underpin if events occur which cause it to determine that the conditions are no longer appropriate and the amendment is required so that the conditions achieve their original purpose and are not materially less difficult to satisfy.</p>

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and process	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics	
All-employee share plans	Encourages Executive Directors and employees to acquire shares in order to increase the alignment of interests with shareholders over the longer term.	<p>The Company operates a Share Incentive Plan (SIP) under which all employees, including Executive Directors, may be awarded free shares and may purchase shares which can be matched on up to a two-for-one basis. The Company's current practice is to operate partnership and matching shares only. If the shares are held in a trust for at least three years and the employee does not leave the Company during that period, then the matched shares may be retained by the individual subject to some relief against income tax and national insurance contributions. Dividends are also paid directly to participants on all SIP shares.</p> <p>Shareholders have also approved a Save As You Earn Scheme (SAYE) for all employees which is not currently operated but which might be utilised in the future. Under the SAYE, participants (which may include Executive Directors) may make monthly contributions over a savings period linked to the grant of an option with an exercise price which may be at a discount of up to 20% of the market value of the underlying shares at grant.</p> <p>Awards under the SIP and SAYE may be adjusted to reflect the impact of any variation of share capital.</p>	<p>Under the SIP, maximum participation will be in line with the prevailing maximum limits set by HMRC under the relevant legislation.</p> <p>Under the SAYE, maximum participation will be in line with the prevailing maximum limits set by HMRC under the relevant legislation.</p>	As is typical under HMRC tax-advantaged all-employee plans, there are no performance conditions attached to awards.
Shareholding policy	To ensure that Executive Directors' interests are aligned with those of shareholders over a longer time horizon.	Executive Directors are expected to accumulate and maintain a holding in shares in the Company equivalent in value to no less than 300% of base salary.	Not applicable.	Not applicable.
		Executive Directors are expected to retain the lower of actual shares held at cessation and shares equal to 300% of salary for two years post-cessation. This guideline will apply in respect of any vested shares which vest from DSBP, LTIP and RSP awards granted after the 2020 AGM (unless the Committee no longer considers it necessary).		
		Shares retained following vesting of LTIP and/or DSBP and/or RSP awards granted after the 2020 AGM will be held in a nominee arrangement to enable enforcement of post-cessation share ownership guidelines.		

Notes to the future Policy table

1. Performance measures and targets

Short- and long-term performance measures will be selected by the Committee in order to provide a direct connection to the Company's strategy or key performance indicators at the time. Relative measures will be assessed against appropriate comparators.

Absolute measures are set following a robust budget setting process which takes into account internal financial indicators as well as a broader view of the market environment.

The targets for the Annual Bonus are commercially sensitive and will be reported in the subsequent Directors' remuneration report. The measures applicable to the 2026/27 financial year are set out on page 124. As referred to in the Committee Chair's statement, it is intended that appropriate targets will be set for each award cycle. The awards are also subject to a general discretion under which the level of vesting may be reduced in certain circumstances.

The Committee is of the opinion that, given the commercial sensitivity around GPE's business, disclosing individuals' targets for the Annual Bonus Plan in advance would not be in the best interests of shareholders or the Company. Actual targets, performance achieved and awards made will be published at the end of performance periods so shareholders can fully assess the basis for any payouts.

2. Differences in remuneration approach for all employees

All employees of GPE are entitled to base salary and benefits on the same basis, with quantum of awards being set at levels commensurate with their role. All employees participate in an employee Annual Bonus Plan, with quantum of awards being set at levels commensurate with their role and with performance measures, similar to the executive scheme, based on Group performance and against personal objectives. Senior managers will receive RSP awards with quantum of awards being set at levels commensurate with their role. All employees are eligible to participate in the SIP and the SAYE on the same terms as the Executive Directors.

All employees are eligible to join the Company's defined contribution pension plan and receive a contribution of up to (currently) 15% of salary (other than some employees who participated in the Company's defined benefit pension plan, which was closed to further accrual from 1 April 2025, who receive a higher rate of contribution).

3. Discretion

The Committee will operate the Annual Bonus Plan, RSP (and deal with legacy LTIP awards) and DSBP awards according to their respective rules and ancillary documents and in accordance with the Listing Rules where relevant. The Committee retains discretion, consistent with market practice, in a number of regards as to the operation and administration of these plans as noted in the Policy table and in the Approach to Recruitment remuneration and Payments for loss of office sections as relevant. Any use of these discretions would, where relevant, be explained in the Directors' remuneration report and may, as appropriate, be the subject of consultations with the Company's major shareholders. The inclusion of caps does not represent any aspiration.

The all-employee tax-advantaged share plans will be operated in accordance with HMRC guidance and their respective rules.

In addition, the Committee has the discretion to amend the Policy with regard to minor or administrative matters where it would be, in the opinion of the Committee, disproportionate to seek or wait for shareholder approval.

Details of share awards granted to existing Executive Directors are set out on page 123 of the Directors' remuneration report. These remain eligible to vest based on their original award terms, in line with the policy set out in the Policy table or under the authority of the previously approved remuneration policy (as will other legacy arrangements, including those awarded prior to promotion to the Board).

Non-Executive Director remuneration

Element	Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and process	Maximum opportunity	Performance metrics
Fees	Provide an appropriate reward to attract individuals with appropriate knowledge and experience to review and support the implementation of the Company's strategy.	<p>The Chair of the Board and the Executive Directors are responsible for setting the remuneration of the Non-Executive Directors, other than the Chair whose remuneration is determined by the Committee.</p> <p>Non-Executive Directors are paid a base fee and additional fees for membership or chairmanship of Committees and for the role of Senior Independent Director.</p> <p>Fees are usually reviewed annually with changes effective from 1 April.</p> <p>Non-Executive Directors do not participate in any of the Company's incentive arrangements. Other benefits include travel, accommodation and membership subscriptions related to the Company's business. Reasonable business-related expenses will be reimbursed (including any tax due thereon).</p>	<p>Fees will be in line with market rates for Non-Executive Directors at FTSE 250 companies.</p> <p>The aggregate maximum will be the limit approved by shareholders in accordance with the Articles of Association, which is currently £1,000,000.</p> <p>In the normal course, the Committee would generally consider awarding the Chair (and the other Directors would generally consider awarding the Non-Executive Directors) an annual increase in line with the rate of inflation for staff generally. However, this is not automatic and any decisions will be taken in the round.</p> <p>The 2026/27 fee levels are set out on page 126.</p>	Not applicable.

Directors' remuneration policy continued

Approach to recruitment remuneration

The Committee's approach to recruitment remuneration is to pay no more than is necessary to attract appropriate candidates to the role, and our principle is that the pay of any new recruit would be assessed following the same principles as for the Directors as set out in the Policy previously summarised.

Executive Director recruitment

Component	Policy
Base salary and benefits	The salary level will be set taking into account relevant market data, the experience and skills of the individual, responsibilities of the individual and the salaries paid to similar roles in comparable companies in line with the current process undertaken by the Committee when setting the salary levels for its existing Directors. Whilst it is not envisaged that it will be required, as provided for in the relevant regulations, the Committee reserves the right to exceed the fixed pay limits set out in the policy table, in exceptional circumstances, to secure the appointment of a high-calibre individual. Executive Directors shall be eligible to receive benefits in line with the Company's benefits policy, as set out in the remuneration policy table.
Pension	Executive Directors will be able to receive a pension contribution or receive a supplement in lieu of pension contributions in line with the Company's pension policy as set out in the remuneration policy table.
Annual bonus	Executive Directors will be eligible to participate in the Annual Bonus Plan with at least 40% (or 20% when the minimum share ownership guideline level is met) of the bonus outcome normally subject to deferral under the DSBP, as set out in the remuneration policy table. For Executive Directors joining part way through a year, awards would be pro-rated. Different performance measures may be set initially for the Annual Bonus Plan, taking into account the responsibilities of the individual, and the point in the financial year that they joined. The annual maximum potential opportunity under this plan is 150% of salary.
Long-term incentives	Executive Directors will be eligible to participate in the RSP set out in the remuneration policy table. Awards may be granted up to the maximum opportunity allowable under plan rules at the Committee's discretion of 150% of salary under the RSP. An award may be made on or shortly following an appointment assuming the Company is not in a prohibited period.
Share buy-outs/ replacement awards	Awards may be granted to replace those forfeited by the Executive Director from a previous employer on taking up the appointment where considered necessary by the Committee. The Committee will seek to structure any replacement awards such that overall they are no more generous in terms of quantum or vesting period than the awards due to be forfeited. Where the Company compensates new Executive Directors in this way, it will seek to do so under the terms of the Company's existing variable remuneration arrangements, but may compensate on terms that are more bespoke than the existing arrangements, including awards granted under UK Listing Rule 9.3.2, where the Committee considers this to be appropriate. In such instances, the Company will disclose a full explanation of the detail and rationale for such recruitment-related compensation. In making such awards, the Committee will seek to take into account the nature (including whether awards are cash or share-based), vesting period and performance measures and/or conditions for any remuneration forfeited by the individual in leaving a previous employer. Where such awards had outstanding performance or service conditions (which are not significantly completed), the Company will generally impose equivalent conditions. In exceptional cases, the Committee may relax those requirements where it considers this to be in the interest of the shareholders, for example through applying a significant discount to the face value of the replacement awards.
Relocation policies	In instances where the new Executive Director is non-UK domiciled or needs to be relocated, the Company may provide one-off or ongoing compensation as part of the Executive Director's relocation benefits to reflect the cost of relocation for the Executive in cases where they are expected to spend significant time away from their country of domicile. The level of the relocation package will be assessed on a case-by-case basis and may take into consideration any cost of living differences, housing allowance and/or schooling.
Legacy arrangements	Where an Executive Director is appointed from within the organisation, the normal policy of the Company is that any legacy arrangements would be honoured in line with the original terms and conditions on a pro-rata basis. Similarly, if an Executive Director is appointed following the Company's acquisition or merger with another company, legacy terms and conditions on a pro-rata basis would be honoured.

Non-Executive Director recruitment

Component	Policy
Fees	Newly appointed Non-Executive Directors will be paid fees consistent with existing Non-Executive Directors.

Service agreements and payments for loss of office

The policy of the Company is to have service contracts for Executive Directors with notice periods of one year. It is sometimes necessary when recruiting a new Executive Director to give a service contract with an initial term of up to 18 months, in which case a 12-month notice period may be given no earlier than six months from the start date of the contract.

Non-Executive Directors, who have letters of appointment, are subject to annual re-election under the Company's Articles of Association and typically have a notice period of three months by either party (although this may be reviewed from time to time).

The following table sets out the dates of each of the Executive Directors' service agreements and their unexpired term, the dates of the Non-Executive Directors' letters of appointment and the date on which the Non-Executive Director is next subject to reappointment or re-election.

Executive	Date of service agreement	Unexpired term (months)
Toby Courtauld	18 March 2002 (amended 2017)	12
Dan Nicholson	30 July 2021	12
Jayne Cottam	16 January 2026	12

Non-Executive	Date of appointment letter	Date when next subject to appointment or re-election
William Eccleshare	3 February 2025	2 July 2026
Karen Green	15 June 2023	2 July 2026
Vicky Jarman	22 January 2020	2 July 2026
Mark Anderson	30 July 2021	2 July 2026
Emma Woods	25 January 2022	2 July 2026
Champa Magesh	6 June 2022	2 July 2026
Peter Duffy ¹	2 February 2026	2 July 2026

1. Peter Duffy was appointed to the Board on 2 March 2026 and will be subject to election at the next AGM on 2 July 2026.

The service agreements and letters of appointment are available for inspection by shareholders at the Company's registered office.

Executive Directors may, with the consent of the Committee, retain fees paid to them for acting as a Non-Executive Director of a company outside the Group, except where the directorship is as a representative of the Group.

The Company's policy on termination payments for Executive Directors is to consider the circumstances on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the relevant contractual terms, the circumstances of the termination and any applicable duty to mitigate. It is the Committee's policy not to reward poor performance. The Committee will always seek to minimise the cost to the Company whilst seeking to reflect the circumstances in place at the time. The Committee will honour Executive Directors' contractual entitlements. Service contracts do not contain liquidated damages clauses. If a contract is to be terminated, the Committee will determine such mitigation as it considers fair and reasonable in each case. There are no contractual arrangements that would guarantee a pension with limited or no abatement on severance or early retirement. There is no agreement between the Company and its Directors providing for compensation for loss of office or employment that occurs because of a takeover bid. The Company reserves the right to make additional payments where such payments are made in good faith in discharge of an existing legal obligation (or by way of damages for breach of such an obligation), or by way of settlement or compromise of any claim arising in connection with the termination of an Executive Director's office or employment. The Company may also deem it appropriate to pay on behalf of a departing Executive Director modest legal, outplacement or other fees.

Contracts include a right for the Company to achieve mitigation through payment on a monthly phased basis with payments reducing/ ceasing if an alternative role is found during the balance of any notice period.

Base salary, benefits and pension

Toby Courtauld's and Jayne Cottam's compensation in lieu of notice payable at the Company's discretion is 12 months' basic salary. Compensation in lieu of notice to Dan Nicholson, payable at the Company's discretion, is 12 months' basic salary and the value of contractual benefits that would have been payable during the shorter of the minimum applicable notice period and any unexpired period of notice. In each case, the Company may elect to pay the compensation in lieu of notice in equal monthly instalments. Each individual is under a duty to mitigate against any payment in lieu of notice by seeking alternative employment or engagement and the Company has the right to reduce any payment in lieu of notice in given circumstances.

Directors' remuneration policy continued

Approach to other remuneration payments on termination of employment and change of control

In addition to the payment of base salary, benefits and pension as set out above, the Group's Annual Bonus Plan, RSP, DSBP, SIP and SAYE contain provisions for the termination of employment.

Component	Good Leaver ¹	Bad Leaver ²	Change of control
Annual Bonus Plan	Where an Executive Director's employment is terminated after the end of a performance year but before the payment is made, the Executive will be eligible for an annual bonus award for that performance year subject to an assessment based on performance achieved over the period. Where an Executive Director's employment is terminated during a performance year, a pro-rata annual bonus for the period worked in that performance year may be payable in relation to that year's bonus.	Outstanding award is forfeited.	An Executive Director may receive a bonus, the amount of which will be determined by the Committee, taking into account such factors as it considers relevant, including the proportion of the elapsed performance period at the date of change of control and performance to that point.
Deferred Share Bonus Plan (DSBP)	Awards may be retained until the normal vesting date. In exceptional circumstances the Committee may accelerate vesting at the date of cessation.	Outstanding awards lapse.	In accordance with the rules of the DSBP, outstanding awards will normally vest in full on a change of control.
Restricted Share Plan (RSP)	Awards may vest at the date of cessation of employment or the normal vesting date (including any applicable holding period) at the discretion of the Committee. Awards will vest based on the performance achieved up to the date of cessation/normal vesting date at the discretion of the Committee and be pro-rated to reflect the amount of time elapsed since the award date. The Committee retains the discretion to disregard time when determining the level of vesting. This would only be considered in exceptional circumstances and, where considered, the Committee would take into account the circumstances of the cessation of employment.	Outstanding awards lapse.	In accordance with the rules of the RSP, on a change of control, vesting will occur immediately. Performance against targets and/or the underpin will be assessed by the Committee on a change of control. The number of shares vesting will normally be reduced pro-rata to reflect the amount of time elapsed from the award date until the change of control as a proportion of the original vesting period. The Committee retains the discretion to disregard time when determining the level of vesting. This would only be considered in exceptional circumstances and, where considered, the Committee would take into account the overall context of the deal and the actual value.
Share Incentive Plan (SIP)	All shares can be sold or transferred out of the SIP. Free, Matching and Partnership shares may be removed tax-free. If dividend shares are taken out of the SIP within three years of being awarded, the dividend used to buy them is subject to income tax at the dividend rate. On resignation, matched shares held for less than three years will be forfeited.	Free shares and matched shares held for less than three years will be forfeited. Partnership and matched shares held for more than three years but less than five years will be liable to tax depending on time held in the SIP. If dividend shares are taken out of the SIP within three years of being awarded, the dividend used to buy them is subject to income tax at the dividend rate.	All shares can be sold or transferred out of the SIP. Free, Matching and Partnership shares may be removed tax-free. If dividend shares are taken out of the SIP within three years of being awarded, the dividend used to buy them is subject to income tax at the dividend rate.
Save As You Earn scheme (SAYE)	Options may be exercised during a period of six months following cessation of employment (or 12 months following cessation in the event of death).	Options held for less than three years will lapse on cessation. Options held for more than three years may be exercised during a period of six months following cessation, except where the reason for cessation is misconduct.	Options may be exercised in the event of a change of control of the Company.

1. Good leavers under each of the Annual Bonus Plan, RSP, DSBP, SIP and SAYE are those leaving under specified conditions as set out below.


- Annual Bonus Plan and RSP:
 - death;
 - ill-health, injury or disability (evidenced to the satisfaction of the Committee);
 - redundancy;
 - retirement;
 - the award holder's employing company or business being transferred out of the Group; or
 - any other circumstances at the discretion of the Committee, including where appropriate (and exceptionally), resignation. The Committee will only use its general discretion where it considers this to be appropriate, taking into account the circumstances of the termination and the performance in the context of each plan and will provide a full explanation to shareholders of the basis of its determination. The exercise of the Committee's discretion under one plan will not predetermine the exercise of its discretion under another.
- Under the DSBP, all leavers will be considered 'good', except where the employee is dismissed for misconduct.
- Good leavers under the SIP and SAYE are those participants leaving in certain circumstances as under applicable legislation, including death, injury, disability, retirement and redundancy.

2. Bad leavers are those leavers who are not good leavers.


Executive Director remuneration scenarios based on performance

The charts below set out the potential remuneration receivable by Executive Directors for minimum (where performance is below threshold for variable awards), on-target and maximum performance. Potential reward opportunities are based on the Policy and applied to salaries for the year ending 31 March 2027. It should be noted that the projected values exclude the impact of any dividend accrual.


Chief Executive £000



Executive Director £000



Chief Financial Officer £000



Legend: RSP (purple), Annual bonus (black), Fixed (green)

Assumptions: Executive Director remuneration scenarios 2027

Fixed

Consists of base salary, contractual and non-contractual benefits, pension and participation in the UK all-employee share plan:

	Base Salary ¹ £000	Benefits ² £000	Pension ³ £000	SIP ⁴ £000	Total Fixed £000
Toby Courtauld	734	16	110	4	864
Dan Nicholson	438	11	66	4	519
Jayne Cottam	440	11	66	4	521

1. Base salary is the salary for the year ending 31 March 2027.
2. Benefits are as shown in the single figure table for 2026 in the Directors' remuneration report. For Jayne Cottam, the benefits figure is estimated based on a full-year equivalent.
3. Pension contributions are based on 15% of salary for the year ending 31 March 2027.
4. The assumed value of the matching shares awarded under the SIP based on full participation during the year.

Variable pay

Based on what the Executive Director would receive at performance levels of:

Minimum	Annual Bonus: no payout. RSP: no vesting of awards under the RSP.
On-target*	Annual Bonus: consists of on-target payout of 75% of salary (being 50% of maximum bonus opportunity). RSP: assumes maximum vesting of awards (150% of salary).
Maximum*	Annual Bonus: consists of the maximum bonus payout of 150% of salary. RSP: assumes maximum vesting of awards (150% of salary).
Impact of share price appreciation**	Annual Bonus: consists of the maximum bonus payout of 150% of salary. RSP: assumes maximum vesting of awards (150% of salary), with a 50% share price increase applied to the RSP award.

- * Excluding share price appreciation and accrual of dividend equivalent payments.
** Excluding accrual of dividend equivalent payments.

Directors' remuneration policy continued

Consideration of remuneration of other employees

The Committee seeks to apply consistent principles of remuneration across the organisation and takes into account wider employee pay and conditions when determining the remuneration of the Executive Directors. As part of the annual pay review, the Committee receives a report setting out changes to all employee remuneration levels and proposed discretionary bonus awards. The Company also discusses gender pay gap statistics alongside its diversity and inclusion objectives. Details regarding the broad operation of the Company's remuneration policy and principles for all employees and the Executive Directors can be found on pages 114. The Company engages with employees on remuneration generally, including executive remuneration. As part of the new Policy review, the Remuneration Committee Chair held two interactive all-employee sessions in January 2026 to discuss the proposed changes to the Policy (see page 96).

The Committee is advised of pay levels throughout the Group and specifically approves the packages of more senior colleagues. In considering the position, it is advised of benchmark pay levels for most roles.

The Board is committed to investing in and rewarding its workforce. Details of how the Company invests in its people (including through learning and development programmes, career progression, wellbeing support and employee engagement) can be found in the Our people and culture section of the Strategic Report on pages 63 to 67.

The Committee is satisfied that the Company's approach to workforce remuneration supports GPE's purpose and long-term sustainable success.

Consideration of shareholder views

When determining remuneration, the Committee takes into account the guidelines of investor bodies and shareholder views. The Committee is always open to feedback from shareholders on remuneration policy and arrangements, and commits to undertaking shareholder consultation in advance of any significant changes to the Policy.

As part of the 2026 Policy review, the Committee conducted a thorough consultation with major shareholders (representing approximately 70% of the share register) and the main proxy voting advisers.

Deliberation and process

The Committee ensures it seeks independent advice as appropriate, and the Committee also has access to the HR Director and General Counsel & Company Secretary without the executives present. Consistent with good practice, any decisions are taken without the affected individual present.

This Report and Policy will be submitted to shareholders for approval at the 2026 AGM, which is expected to be held on 2 July 2026.

Approved by the Board on 20 May 2026 and signed on its behalf by:

Emma Woods
Chair of the Remuneration Committee

20 May 2026